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Introduction
In 1978, Mary C. Northern was admitted to Tennessee Nashville General Hospital for an
infection in both of her feet. It was discovered that Ms. Northern was suffering from untreated
and severely gangrenous frostbite, which is deemed fatal if left untreated.

The healthcare

professionals agreed that in order to prevent the gangrene from spreading, both of her feet would
need to be amputated. However, Ms. Northern strongly refused the life-saving operation. Ms.
Northern posed no threat to anyone; however, it is questionable what the most ethical course of
action is when a patient refuses treatment. This raises the question, should a patient be able to
refuse a life-saving treatment, or should a healthcare professional force treatment upon the
patient? A philosophical dilemma arises between the healthcare professionals’ interest to benefit
the patient’s well-being and the interest of the patient to receive preferred treatment and express
self-determination. The traditional bioethical principles are inefficient to allow the most ethical
decision.

The most ethical decision is one which modernizes the dated principle-based

philosophy and highlights the need for an enhanced approach to patient autonomy.
Bioethical principles form the cornerstone for ethical medical decisions; however, a
modern interpretation takes into account the increasing complexities which create dense ethical
questions. The ability to make one’s own medical decisions, promote wellness, relieve pain and
suffering through medicine, to do no harm, and the values of equality and fairness in medical
treatments are all important principles when considering medical decisions; however the most
crucial aspect of ethical decision-making is patient autonomy.

Especially in light of ever-

increasing medical advancements, it is the healthcare professional’s moral duty to fully inform
the patient of all medical information and alternatives to enhance patient autonomy.
The fundamental bioethical principles were formulated in the 1960s to resolve
increasingly complex ethical and legal issues resulting from modem western technologized
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medicine (Jonsen 1990, 57).

The historical influence of these emerging principles are now

widely accepted as the standard for ethical decision-making. The 1974 Belmont Report identified
important ethical principles that ought to be upheld in biomedical research.1 Tom Beauchamp
and James Childress reformatted the ideas into the lour cardinal bioethical principles, known as
the “Georgetown Mantra,” including the principle of autonomy, beneficence, non-maleficence,
Although there is strong influence, principlism is inefficient as a “predominantly abstract,
rationalistic mode of reasoning in bioethics,” especially in the context of modern medical
advancements (Dawson 1998, 516; Traphagan 2013, 31). The bioethical principles should not
“be used in a deductive way, where principles were merely applied to specific cases” (Wolf
1996, 16. Despite modern medical achievements, the discussion of bioethics has relatively
remained stagnant (Dawson 2010).

Modern medical advancements call for modern

interpretations of bioethical principles.

Patient autonomy is the focus of modem ethical

decision-making with Beauchamp and Childress’s original proposals to understand the
complexity of decision-making. The two cases studies presented exhibit the need to uphold
patient autonomy for ethical decision-making. Furthermore, these two cases reveal disparities
among decisions based on false beliefs and the cultural influences of medical decision-making.
Case Studies
When 72-year-old Mary C. Northern was admitted to the Tennessee Nashville General
Hospital, she adamantly refused to have the surgery to amputate both her feet. The conflict arose
when Ms. Northern expressed no desire to die, yet insisted her strong belief that her condition
would improve without the surgery, regardless of the medical advice. It was recorded that “she

1

The Belmont Report emerged from the National Commission for the Protection of Human Subjects of Biomedical and Behavioral
Research (Paola 2010, 39).
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tends to believe that her feet are black because of soot or dirt.”23Ms. Northern was “unable to
unwilling to recognize” her condition would result in death it gone untreated and did not
“appreciate” the consequences of her decision (Arras and Steinbeck 1999, 171).

The court

argued that Ms. Northern did not have the ability to refuse treatment and assigned Ms. Northern
a legal guardian to override her medical decision and consent to the amputation. However, there
is moral complications Ms. Northern as incompetent for refusing treatment because in this
specific case, there was a largely lacking evidence of general incompetence. The was a lack of
any neurological disability, as it was recorded that Ms. Nothern as “lucid, shows no evidence of
dementia, possesses good memory and recall, and is coherent and intelligent” about general
information.
In the same year, 77-year-old Mrs. Rosaria Candura was hospitalized at Symmes
Hospital, Massachusetts also for gangrene in her leg. Mrs. Candura’s daughter sought a probate
court order to have temporary guardianship over her mother in hopes to give legal consent for the
surgery to amputate her mother’s leg.

Mrs. Candura was stubborn in her unwillingness to

consider other points of view and persistent in her wish to not have the surgery.3 However, the
court’s decision for Mrs.Candura diverged from Ms. Nothern’s court case and it was decided
Mrs. Candura could legally refuse the amputation, despite similar grim odds of survival. The
court stated, “We hold that Mrs. Candura has the right under the law to refuse to submit either to
medical treatment or a surgical operation, that on the evidence and findings in this case the
decision is one that she may determine for herself, and that therefore her leg may not be
amputated unless she consents to that course of action.”4 Mrs. Candura understood that without

2 State Dept, of Hum.
3

Serv. v. Northern 562 S.W.2d 197(1978) State of Tennessee.

Lane v. Candura. American Journal Of Law & Medicine. Fall78 1978;4(3):289. Available from: Legal Collection, Ipswich, MA.
Accessed February 19, 2016.
4imdb.
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the surgery there would be a low chance of survival.

However, Mrs. Candura had lost her

husband shortly before this diagnosis and this loss deeply affected her desire to continuing to
live. Although Mrs. Candura was adamant about not contemplating other choices, she ultimately
expressed her contentment with death and expressed her lack of desire to survive. Furthermore,
Mrs. Candura described that she did not want the sense of burden to her daughter, Grace R.
Lane. The court decided that Mrs. Candura could deny the potentially life-saving amputation
(Davis 2004).
The moral differences between these two cases is that Ms. Northern is arguably acting
out of a false belief and the healthcare professionals did not act to enhance her autonomy. These
two cases are supportive of the argument that patient autonomy ought to be upheld for ethical
medical decisions. These two cases are strikingly similar, as both cases of elderly women had
identical cases of gangrene, as well as the well-being and survival of the patient was determined
to have amputation. However, there was a contrasting decision to pursue the amputation with
Ms. Northern and not with Mrs. Candura. The decision to allow Mrs. Candura to deny the
amputation was morally sound and upheld patient autonomy; however, it was morally dubious to
force the amputation upon Ms. Northern.

There is insufficient evidence that healthcare

professionals upheld their moral duty to enhance the patient autonomy with her refusal of
treatment.
The four main principles set forth by Beauchamp and Childress are the traditional
foundation for ethical decision-making; however, in this case, are insufficient for the most
ethical choice. The principles of justice, beneficence, and nonmaleficence have minor relevance
to informed refusal, especially in these cases. The primary focus to make these decisions the
most ethical would be an updated principle of autonomy. The general principle of autonomy

6

does not signify a coherent or clear identification of when a patient is able to refuse treatment.
The Curve of Competency clarifies to what extent one ought to deem incompetent about a
specific topic, but otherwise generally competent.
The bioethical principle of justice more readily applies to the equality and fairness of
distributing treatment rather than refusing treatment. Beauchamp and Childress identify justice
as the fair distribution of benefits, risks, and costs (2009). The principle of formal justice in
relation to bioethics, based upon John Rawls’ ‘justice as fairness’ egalitarian theory, regards
entitlement, equality, and allocation of scarce resources and treatment (Paola et al. 2010). The
principle of justice in relation to medical treatment is the moral standard to treat all patients with
equal and fair treatment regardless of any external factor, such as socioeconomic status. In both
cases presented, the healthcare professionals offered the same treatment because it was presumed
that amputation was the best medical treatment. There was no prevalent bias or unfair treatment
from the healthcare professionals in these scenarios; therefore, no injustice is clearly visible. The
patients were offered the same solution of amputation to their gangrene, despite being states
apart. Further ethical dilemmas arise when there is unequal access to medical treatment as well
as a discussion of the justice aspects to offer necessary versus unnecessary and periphery uses of
medicine. However, the discussion of the ethics of the necessary medical treatment and is
beyond the scope of this paper.
The bioethical principles of beneficence and nonmaleficence are two minorly relevant
principles when discussing patient refusal of treatment.

The principle of nonmaleficence is

formulated from the medical doctrine, the Hippocratic Oath.5 The Hippocratic Oath has become
the maxim Primum non nocere: “Above all [or first] do no harm” and has been reformatted to

5

The Hippocratic Oath is referred to as a principle for all healthcare professionals; however, the actual document is more of a ritual
than a binding doctrine.
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the role of “bring benefit and do no harm” has been reformatted to the role of “bring benefit and
do no harm” (Paola et al., 2010 43,52).

This principle sets forth the moral obligation for

healthcare professionals to avoid harm, but also their duty to promote beneficence towards the
patient.
General beneficence is the obligation to do good towards all persons, regardless of a
specific relationship and sets forth moral guidelines (Beauchamp and Childress 2009, 199).
Within the bioethical sphere, beneficence specifically relates to the moral guidelines of the
physician-patient relationship. Healthcare professionals are morally obligated to advocate for the
best interest of the patient and to refrain or limit harm (Paola, et al. 2010, 55). Harm is identified
to have an “adverse effect on one's interest” (Paola, et al. 2010, 86). However, harm can be
more complex depending on who is defining harm.

From the perspective of the healthcare

professional, the best interest of the patient is to advocate for health benefits or prolong life and
acting adversely to these interests would promote harm. Thus, in the context of the case of Ms.
Northern and Mrs. Candura. the best course of action in the eyes of the healthcare professionals
is to advocate for amputation to save the patient's life. However, from the perspective from the
patient, the quality of life may be deemed of higher importance rather than prolonging their life.
This conflict of interest is imminent when patients refuse treatment because of the direct
contradiction of what the physician would recommend and what the patient will accept for
medical treatment. The notion of personal “good” is predicated on the patient’s and his or her
family’s interpretation of what is in their best interests are while “notions of truth of biomedicine
are seen as an unqualified “good” that should take be balanced with the individual’s autonomy.
(McGrath 1998, 527). This is exemplified in Mrs. Candura’s case, where her interest was not to
prolong her life, but to express her right for self-determination. She expressed awareness and
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contentment with the consequence that refusing treatment would likely result in death. Ms.
Northern had conflicting interests where she did not want to pursue the surgery, yet had no desire
for the consequence of death. This contradiction results from her false belief, which is addressed
in a future section. The principle of nonmaleficence “involves considering alternative routes,”
for all types of procedure considered. In this particular case, amputation surgery may appear to
be an obvious benefit in regards to save their life, there is also the consequence of not being able
to walk. There are modern prosthetics that may be considered in order to ensure the principle of
nonmaleficence is honored. If the patient, such as Ms. Northern or Mrs. Candura, still refuses
the amputation, they must be presented with other options with full disclosure. Other options
may be to have palliative care, pain relief, discussion if amputation is considered about artificial
limb options, hyperbaric oxygen therapy to increase oxygen in the blood supply. As medical
technology advances, there are increasing alternatives to promote the good ongoing antibiotic
treatments to prevent the spread of the disease, or future options as medical technology advances.
The ethical responsibility of the physicians is to “collect information regarding patient and
surgical outcomes to enhance the informed consent dialogue with patients and maximize safety”
( Arora et. al. 2014, 1200).
The informative role of a healthcare provider is to simply provide information. However,
it must be useful and understandable for the patient. Also, there is an interpretive role to explain
and define medical information. Ms. Northern received only a third-grade education; therefore,
she would have a difficult time interpreting dense medical information. Any patient would have
a different interpretation of dense information, let alone the increasing medical technology. The
patient has their perspective, considered as the “voice of the life world,” where only the patient
knows what it would be like to live through treatment and handle the aftermath. On the other
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hand, the healthcare professional would articulate their perspective as the “voice of medicine”
(McGrath 1998, 521). Another role of healthcare providers is to be deliberative, which requires
healthcare professionals

to avoid dumping technical

information, rather encouraging

conversations with the patient about values, cares, and concerns. The decision-making process is
not which is not “based on a static risk-to-benefit ratio that is the same for each patient, but
rather a candid, back-and-forth conversation between patient and physician regarding values, risk
factors, goals...and medical information” (Arora et. al. 2014, 1200).
Although healthcare professionals have the best interest to benefit and prevent harm to
the patient, this does not generally justify paternalistic acts to override a competent patient’s
choice in medical decisions.

Paternalistic acts involve the “intentional overriding of one

person’s preferences or actions by another person” and dictating medical action (Beauchamp and
Childress 2009, 208). Until about twenty years ago. paternalism was the standard for physicianpatient relationships.

It was assumed that all patients ought to follow every physician order

(Kelley 2005, 189). Traditionally, patients seek medical treatment and care from healthcare
professionals, creating a hierarchical relationship and are referred to as “gatekeepers” (Holmstom
and Dall’Alba 2002). The healthcare professional’s know ledge of medical information and the
care flow from the healthcare professional to the patient in a top-down system and creates a
higher fiduciary duty for the healthcare professional. There is also an assumption of trust that
the healthcare professional will disclose relevant and accurate information. The Supreme Court
of California declared in Truman v. Thomas that “it is the duty of a physician to disclose to his
[or her] patient all relevant information to enable the patient to make an informed decision
regarding the submission to or refusal to lake a diagnostic test” (Ryan 161). There is complexity
regarding paternalism based on how well the patient is informed. Soft paternalism applies when
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the patient is poorly informed or may be in an emotional state that inhibits the rationale while
hard paternalism occurs when the patient is fully capable of making the rationale, but the
healthcare professional intervenes (Beauchamp and Childress 2009, 209-10). There is larger
grey area within soft-paternalism due to the uncertain levels of rationality and good intentions to
intervene to prevent future harm. Although it was once seen as the norm, there are now moral
reconsiderations and patient autonomy has emerged to have greater importance.

The

“acceptance of even limited paternalistic intervention [could] open a Pandora’s box which could
substantially threaten personal freedom” (Faden 1977. 135).
There is a lack of evidence in Ms. Northern’s case that the healthcare professionals
conversed or deliberated with her about her choices. The order for a state appointed legal
guardian for Ms. Northern is paternalistic without fulfilling the obligation to discuss, converse
and deliberate with Ms. Northern about her choice. The healthcare professionals should have
The principles of beneficence and nonmaleficence underline the importance of selfdetermination and autonomy.

Autonomy is formed from the Greek word self, autos, and

governance, nomos (Beauchamp and Childress 2009, 99). Autonomy directs the “protection for
patient rights” through the decision-making process and the patient “is still situated within the
awesome power of the biomedical discourse” (McGrath 1998, 524). The Council of Ethical and
Judicial Affairs and the American Medical Association state the respect for patient autonomy
requires “physicians respect a competent patient’s decision to forego any medical treatment”
(Beauchamp and Childress 2009. 193). Based on this notion, a patient must have apt mental
capabilities to be considered competent for decision-making. The threshold competency can be
difficult to determine in some situations, based on the seriousness and complexity of the
consequences of the decision.

In this principle, there is ambiguity in how healthcare
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professionals ought to rightfully respect patient autonomy.

Peter Murphy identifies this

difficulty of determining autonomy as a choice that is processed through freely and without
external or internal pressures and the ability to determine an autonomous decision is of “admit of
degree” (Murphy 195).
There is an influx of influencing a patient’s decision, including preconceived notions,
false beliefs, cultural norms and familial values.

The danger of a purely principle-based

approach is that there is “little awareness of the complex ways in which people in other societies
conceptualize the nature of being human...and lack a cross-cultural perspective” (Traphagan
2013, 28). Other cultures, such as Japanese or Indian “do not really see each human as a morally
autonomous locus of decision-making - at least not in the relatively isolated sense common in
Western moral philosophy” and view the heads of family or community leaders to have the
cultural justification of paternalism (Peterson 2011, 63). This highlights the importance of the
moral obligation of the healthcare professionals to consider and discuss all options with the
patient as an independent case that has unique influences. The traditional model of autonomous
“:
contribute the ‘facts’ (the projected risks and benefits
decision-making as a recipe: “: clinicians
of the available medical options), while patients provide the ‘values’ (based on their preferences
and ethical commitments). When these are combined, medical decisions emerge.” (Truog 2015,
13). However, the bioethical principle of autonomy is significantly improved by the new modern
Brody’s enhanced autonomy and implements what is the
models, which extends upon Quill and Brody's
original formulation of the curve of competence.
Enhanced Autonomy
Quill and Brody propose a mix of the traditional paternalistic and autonomous choice
called “enhanced autonomy.” that encourages patients and healthcare professionals to “actively
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exchange ideas, explicitly negotiate differences, and share power and influence to serve the
patient’s best outcome” (765).

This method promotes a method that the patient can

autonomously make decisions of their care that are informed by both their personal values and
their physician’s experience and knowledge.

This aligns with the conclusion that a patient can

ultimately decide to accept or deny treatment: however, “enhanced autonomy” provides patients
with a dialogue that allows them to make a fully informed decision. The role of the healthcare
professional is to provide the ideas of beneficence and respect the patient’s values that can
influence their decision.

This would promote trust within the relationship to have active

listening and regard to weigh all the patient’s positions and perspectives (Murphy). One can
easily imagine a case where a hypothetical homeless man needs treatment for gangrene, yet
refuses treatment because he might be under the impression that the treatment is too expensive
for him; however, through further communication with his healthcare professionals, he can be
provided with the correct information and consider the best option. The concept of “enhanced
autonomy” allows for the assurance of patient’s power and control over their course of action.
The non-compliant patient can create an adversarial relationship between the healthcare
professional and patient rather than collaborative (Mill 2004).

The healthcare professionals

“know that their patient’s functional ability and quality of life depend on their success at selfcare” and the existing relationship between the healthcare professional and the patient can be
advanced through the concept of “enhanced autonomy” (Quill and Brody 1996).

Also, the

possibility if a physician overuses their power to influence a patient’s decision is balanced with
the concern of a physician underusing power as a healthcare professional (Murphy 766). This
means that on one hand paternalism could promote a highly-involved physician, while on the
other hand; an irrelevant or disengaged physician could not provide the patient with the best
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outcome. The principle of enhanced autonomy strikes a balance to allow the patient to have full
competence to make decisions about their own health. Enhanced autonomy also encourages the
involvement of the unique qualities of the individual case that are important to the patient’s
decision. One could also foresee a case of a Jehovah Witness refusing blood transfusions would
allow them to make that choice, but being fully informed of the consequences of their deeply
held belief. Once again, patients do have the right to refuse treatment, given the considering they
ought to be fully informed about that choice. It is acknowledged that this active engagement and
trust building within the physician-patient relationship is not currently happening and must be
improved upon to focus on autonomy.
Curve of Competence
Competence means the “ability to perform a task” (Beauchamp and Childress 2009, 112).
Incompetence is usually a legal term to express when a person is found incapable, due to
physical or mental capacity, to make autonomous choices about a particular matter in that
particular time (Davis 2004; Beauchamp and Childress 2009, 112). There are several precedent
standards and examples of how to determine competency.

A concern of Beauchamp and

Childress of trying to adequately measure competence is that “competence itself varies with
risk,” shown by a continuum, “ranging from partial proficiency to complete ineptitude” rather, it
is that certain decisions require higher levels of abilities, including the ability to understand the
consequences (2009, 11 7). Grisso and Appelbaum present a “competence balancing scale,”
which attempts to balance protection against autonomy (Beauchamp and Childress 2009, 116).
The initial balance is weighted more towards autonomy: however, the final balance depends on
“the patient’s mental abilities in the face of the decisional demands, weighed against the
probable gain-risk status of the patient's treatment choices” (116). The precedent formulations to
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measure competence; however, there is severe inadequacies of precedent formulations. There is
no focus on enabling autonomy with regards to an individual choice. The original formulation of
the Curve of Competence significantly improves upon previous notions to modernize the
principle of autonomy.
The ability to determine if a patient is deemed competent enough for decision-making
can be supplemented by the formulation of the “Curve of Competency.” This original term
assists complex ethical dilemmas when a patient may not be deemed fully competent to make a
serious choice, but autonomy still ought to be respected. On the varying levels of competency,
even general competence or a specific competence regarding a particular subject, autonomy
ought to be upheld to its fullest extent.

In regards to denying treatment, there can be a scale of

how important the treatment is for a patient, roughly based on necessity for survival. At the
lowest on the scale can be the ability for a patient with a headache to refuse treatment of
painkillers. On the other end of the spectrum, there is the dire situation that a patient with a
ruptured spleen refuses the life-saving surgery. It is not that serious if someone refuses
Ibuprofen for their headache compared to if someone refuses the surgery to save their life. On
the other axis of the Curve of Competency is the ability to make rational, autonomous
decisions. This spectrum ranges from no ability to make autonomous decisions to full
capability. It is widely accepted that young infants and children are unable to make decisions;
therefore, they would be on the low end of the spectrum. As children grow older, they are able
to choose what they wear, eat, do with their free time, all leading to a more autonomous life. A
fully rational adult would be placed at the top of the spectrum, fully autonomous and able to
make important decisions. Thus, this relationship results in a curve where the ability to make
decisions matches how important the decision, as pictured in Graph 1.
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Capacity for Autonomy

Graph 1. Curve of Competency

Seriousness of Choice

It is argued that the curve can slightly plateau on the right-hand side, meaning that the
most serious of choices may he not need an increase in capacity for autonomy. For example,
cases of the extremely elderly and tremendously sick, some individuals may not want to exercise
their autonomy to make end-of-life decisions (Beauchamp and Childress 2009, 105). In these
cases, the patient would decide to trust and follow the healthcare professional’s wishes rather
than express their own opinions. Once again, this identifies the importance of trust and
communication within the physician-patient relationship. The most ethical decision is one which
is freely chosen; however, the ideal philosophical argument is never as complex as the practical
issue at hand. There is always the question of how a healthcare professional ought to assure the
choice of refusal of treatment is autonomous.
The ability to promote a fully autonomous choice must be with the determination that the
patient is able to rationalize the choices given and comprehends the complete array of risks and
benefits of the choice. The patient that is given a consent form to sign is not enough to assure
the understanding of the decision and its consequences at hand.

Without the complete

comprehension of the benefits and risks, the patient may not make a fully-autonomous
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decision. This indicates that the healthcare professional must explain the benefits and risks of
each option of treatment. Without such understanding- there can be a misconception of what
might happen when the patient ref uses treatment. The continuum of decision-making capacity
and the ability of a patient to make a specific decision also varies at a specific time . If precedent
autonomy, or advance directives, conflict with present decisions, then a resolution autonomy
ought to be followed (Cooper 2010).
Furthermore, an important aspect of respecting autonomous choices is that an individual
is allowed to make decisions even if someone else disagrees or dislikes the decision. A
healthcare professional is able to tell a patient the best recommended course of action, but they
cannot force or coerce the patient into that decision. This leads to determine that the patient is
also responsible for their decision after the healthcare professional has given them the adequate
information. There is also the instance where a patient might hold a falsely held belief. The
patient must be fully informed and be able to comprehend the provided information, yet still hold
the false belief. It must be certain that there is an informed refusal, even after being fully
informed and adequately comprehends the information (Beauchamp and Childress 2009, 130).
The responsibility of the healthcare professional to ensure the patient to understand the
information provided as well as understands the patient's point of view is essential to provide
adequate medical care.
Patient Refusal Based on False Beliefs
Most people make decisions based on their preconceived notions or biases that are able to
not be recognized or highly reflected upon. These notions can influence a patient’s decision to
accept or refuse treatment. What should be done if a patient has false belief? There are some
people that do not reflect upon their values and do not deliberate over their preconceived

17

notions. “Most of us are first-time players with no training” in making difficult ethical decisions,
therefore, difficult decisions are influenced by past experience, or emotions, rather than reason
(Dresser 1995, 15). The difficulty of making medical decisions is the ability to understand and
accept the medical facts as the truth.
There is a distinction between if a patient refuses treatment based on their beliefs about
medical facts versus other relevant beliefs.

If the refusal of treatment is based on

misinformation, miscommunication, or ignorance, there is in a sense not that the patient is not
given the full ability to make a rational decision. Based on Aristotle’s argument that an act is
involuntary if “ignorance of the circumstances of the act and of things affected by it” (Faden
1977, 133-4). Therefore, a false belief based on ignorance or false information is not truly a
voluntary decision. For example, if a patient refuses chemotherapy because they believe they
don’t have cancer, then the patient is ignorant about the circumstance. There is another scenario
that the patient refuses based on other beliefs based on their personal values. If the patient is
refusing treatment based on competing values, it must be decided by the individual rather than
the HCP. For example, an individual might value the quality of life over the quantity deems the
choice to refuse treatment. Religious convictions would fall under this category of refusing
treatment based on beliefs. However, this refusal must be informed that the refusal of treatment
will result in the end of life. If a patient states their desire to keep living and extend their life, but
refuses treatment, this conflict seems unwarrantable and unable to be resolved at the current level
of understanding of the circumstance and consequences.
Healthcare professionals “have a moral obligation to attempt to change a patient’s false
belief. This obligation is both justified and limited by the liberty principle” to enhance a fully
informed decision (Faden 1977, 136). This moral calculation on to try to change a false belief
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should be based on how probable the belief is false and how probable the severity of consequent
pursuant to holding this false belief (Faden 1977, 134). The healthcare professional should also
take into consideration that the context, including the severity of the consequence, may justify if
a healthcare professional intervene to try to change the false belief. However, the same liberty
principle that obligates the healthcare professional to try to change the false belief also limits, or
restricts the healthcare professional of intervening in medical decisions. Faden argues the moral
calculation that “intervention is justified only if the amount of freedom lost through the
intervention does not outweigh the gained increased freedom of choice” (1977, 134).

For

example, it is preferable if a healthcare professional tries to inform the patient’s false belief about
having cancer and successfully change their false belief would give the patient greater liberty to
make an informed decision rather than keeping them in the dark trying and not having that
liberty. The view is that the clinicians contribute facts, including the projected risks and benefits
(Truog et al. 2015, 13) but it is ultimately the patient's ability to choose. Overall, a patient might
have an informed refusal that is unwise or unreasonable, but the healthcare professional is never
justified to force treatment. “It is important to distinguish false beliefs as grounds for
incompetency,” especially if the decision is simply deemed of ill-preference or irrational (Faden
1977, 135).
The models of enhanced autonomy and curve of competency work hand-in-hand to
modernize and better utilize autonomy for ethical decision-making.

There are levels of

competency that can relate to the levels of choices that one can fully utilize their autonomy for.
The healthcare professional ought to talk and discuss patient values, to express compassion and
lay out all options. The combination of enhanced autonomy and curve of competency allow a
patient to choose from options, even if those options are limited. For Ms. Northern’s case, she
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should have had further discussions with her healthcare professionals. Another example, if a
patient has dementia, which implies there is no competence for refusing treatment due to
neurological disability, patients ought to still have preference over some decisions. This would
be the preference of there are conditions in which the tune or method which the patient has
treatment. This exemplifies the essence and spirit of respecting and maintaining human dignity
and upholds patient autonomy. Patients may feel a loss of control over their own lives during
medical emergencies or any treatment; therefore, any option that can be implemented to the
patient wishes then ought to be respected.
Implications
One implication if healthcare professionals honor die wishes of the patient, there might
be “significant unnecessary suffering and even death can result” (Murphy 189). A patient may
choose to refuse treatment that goes against the purpose of medicine; however, paternalism
cannot justify reaching beyond the competent patient’s wishes. Peter Murphy attempts to mend
this consequence by promoting that patients are able to decide again if they want to have
treatment to reduce their pain, that a patient has the ability to re-decide without being universally
bound to their original position (189).

The second implication is that a physician might be

justified in discontinuing the relationship with the patients that do not conform to the best patient
care. For example, almost 40% of clinicians say they would discontinue their provider
relationship with families that refuse all vaccines and 28% would refuse if a family refused some
vaccines. However, the Academy’s Committee on Bioethics advises healthcare professionals
listen to the family’s concerns and “share honestly what is and what is not known about the risks
and benefits of the vaccine in question” (deH art, Halsey, Omer, Oresenstien, Salmon 1982).
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There are the tangible consequences of patient responsibility, including reprimanded,
censured, or referred to another physician (Kelley 190). There is the possibility that healthcare
professionals will reach beyond the patient's autonomy in order to protect the overall societal
health. For example, if a person refuses to be treated for an epidemic. It is only in cases of direct
and immediate harm that a healthcare professional is justified to step in and override the
informed refusal. An extreme example is if a patient enters the hospital and creates harm to
other patients or to the staff intervening for the protection of others may be necessary,
showcasing there are exceptions to the general rule of respecting patient informed refusal.
It is interestingly noted that Mary Northern never received the surgery due to concerns of
the serious surgery and Ms. Northern died on May 1, 1978 after a blood clot from the
gangrenous tissue. Her adamant belief about the medical necessity for surgery was due to her
cultural background only having a third-grade education and that she did not believe the African
American doctor informing her (Arras and Steinbeck 1999).
Conclusion
This argument modernizes principle-based philosophy and highlights the need for
enhanced patient autonomy. There is a balance between the healthcare professional look out for
the benefit of the patient with the paternal role and the patient making an autonomous decision
about their care. Healthcare professions ought to strive for the ability to enable the patient to
have the autonomy and allow the patient can refuse treatment. A medical decision cannot be
made alone and it is proposed that through a strong relationship between the healthcare
professional and the patient that a fully autonomous choice can be made. The modern
interpretation of the bioethical principles addresses how to respond to ethical dilemmas after they
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arise in the context of clinical practice” in the certain context when patients refuse treatment
(McGrath 1998, 522).
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